From the Market... to the Market: The Debt Economy after Yugoslavia by Živković, Andreja
CHAPTER 2




The transition to the market economy in the post-Yugoslav states is usually held to have
been derailed first by war and subsequently by a failure to open up sufficiently to
foreign capital. Indeed, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) now blames the present
crisis in this part of the Balkans on an incomplete transition to the market, an
‘unsustainable pre-crisis growth model’, ‘unrealistic memories of past high consumption
standards’, and an ‘oversized public sector focused on consuming rather than investing’,
and prescribes the standard neoliberal remedy of further privatisation and
liberalisation.1
Underlying the concept of a ‘transition’ is the transformation of command into market
economies, economic liberalisation where market forces rather than central planning
bodies set prices, macroeconomic stabilisation to control inflation and impose hard
budget constraints on firms, the creation of a financial sector to channel savings into
investment and the privatisation of state enterprises to foster market competition. But,
even by this neo-classical definition, it is clear that a market economy had long existed
in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As Jože Mencinger, Finance Minister in
the first post-Yugoslav Slovenian government, recalls:
A number of parameters of the market economy existed before 1989: firms had
their autonomy, the basic institutions of the market were in place and the
government had at its disposal many standard macroeconomic instruments. Indeed,
the coordination of the economy was decentralized for many years; since the 1980s,
the impact of inadequate demand prevailed over any eventual shortage of supply,
and the very concept of ‘excess liquidity’ was unknown.2
We will argue here that the present debt crisis in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia is not due
to the lack of market mechanisms, but is precisely a crisis of the market, the expression
of the contradictions of half a century of integration into the world market. The concept
of the transition implies regional separation both from the dynamics of the world
economy in general before 1989 and from the crisis of profitability faced by all
advanced economies from the 1970s in particular, a crisis that led all states to seek
growth through liberalisation, financial integration and restructuring of labour markets
and the public sector. It thereby mystifies the real processes at work: growing economic
dependency and peripheralisation, taking the form of successive debt crises since the
1970s. Each debt crisis has been the pretext for a new wave of integration, of opening
to foreign capital to repay debt, and each has ended in an even greater debt crisis and
economic destruction. The debt crisis today is both a regional expression of the global
crisis of financialised capitalism and a regional crisis of European integration before formal
European integration, mirroring that of Greece and peripheral Europe. The solution, I
claim, lies not in any further opening to foreign capital, but in regional alternatives to
integration into the crisis of European integration. But before arguing for that claim I will
trace the history of the Yugoslav debt economy.
From the Market to … the Market: The Rise of the Yugoslav Debt Economy
In 1949, faced with economic blockade and the threat of invasion by the USSR, Tito’s
Yugoslavia made the fateful decision to turn to Western aid, trade and credits.
Henceforth it found itself obliged to seek greater ‘integration into the world division of
labour’ to finance the technological imports that would lay the economic basis for
geopolitical survival. The strategy of export-led growth was soon brought into question
by the division of Europe into three competing superpower-sponsored trade blocs: the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Free Trade Association. Yugoslav agricultural exports were
faced with the prospect of increasing tariff discrimination as the common external
tariffs of each bloc were gradually harmonised and internal tariffs abolished, especially
with the establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy by the EEC in 1962. Since
Yugoslavia ran a structural trade deficit with the EEC – a deficit that continued to the
very end – it was forced onto the path of deeper market integration with the
Community in order to import finance and technology. To pay for these it had to sell its
mainly agricultural exports to the EEC, and thus open its market to EEC trade.3
Integration reflected a pattern of dependent, financialised development, which can
still be seen in the region today. Yugoslavia’s export orientation in fact meant the
adjustment of its production to European markets that financed the necessary capital
investment. Although Yugoslavia was rapidly becoming an industrial nation, its trade
with the EU remained characteristic of that of a less developed country – importing
capital and intermediate goods in exchange for raw materials, agricultural products and
subcontracted processed goods. Western export of capital goods took the form of the
leasing of patents and licensing agreements – for example, the Zastava licensing
agreement with Fiat – to maintain technological dependency, representing a transfer of
value to EEC capitals. Unable to compete in the technological race, Yugoslavia saved on
labour costs.4 To cover its growing trade deficit and foreign debt it became a major
exporter of unskilled labour to the boom economies of Western Europe, a pattern of
dependency that continues to this day.
The 1970 and 1980 trade agreements, which liberalised trade with the EEC,
accelerated dependency on capital and hard currency imports to finance export growth.
Since these exports struggled to find Western buyers and had to be sold on soft currency
Comecon markets, the result was a worsening of the balance of trade deficit, increasing
inflation, and a ballooning of the foreign debt to $20 billion by 1980. These problems
were in turn the product of a debt economy where the overvaluation of the Yugoslav
dinar made the financing and repayment of foreign credit and capital imports easier,
but at the same time made exports uncompetitive and tended to lead to high rates of
inflation, thus requiring further borrowing to maintain investment growth, a pattern
repeated in Croatia and Serbia in the 2000s. Another problem that would later reappear
was that trade liberalisation with the EEC was a one-way street. While import
dependency implied a remarkably open trade regime on the part of the Yugoslavs, after
the global recession of 1974–5 the EEC raised trade barriers in precisely those areas
where Yugoslavia enjoyed competitive advantage (steel, textiles, tobacco, beef and
veal). In order to cover the yawning trade deficit, Yugoslavia borrowed heavily on
international financial markets and fell into a terminal debt trap.
The Yugoslav financial crisis of the 1970s was an integral part of the global transition
to a financialised capitalism and a neoliberal policy regime. During the crisis of the
1970s, flows of money capital, primarily petrodollars and Eurodollars, seeking
profitable sources of investment, became recycled as international loans, as banks
began to lend on a much larger scale to countries like Mexico, Argentina, Yugoslavia,
Poland and Hungary – the ‘emerging economies’ of their day – to enable them to
promote exports. All defaulted on their loans in the course of the global recession of
1980–2. A new neoliberal ideology took advantage of these debt crises and the economic
shocks of 1974–5, 1980–2 and 1991–2 to open up national markets to international
flows of capital, goods and services.
Raging economic crises in the 1980s in Yugoslavia led to the imposition by
international financial institutions of one of the first structural adjustment programmes
in the world (from 1982–5 and again in 1989–90). The IMF and EEC demanded the
recentralisation of the Yugoslav federation to drive through macroeconomic stabilisation
and financial discipline, and thereby ensure the repayment of the Yugoslav debt. Market
integration had tended to splinter the national economy into a set of regional
economies competing with one another for state credits, foreign currency and resources,
and widen inequalities in regional development – the hothouse of nationalism in
Yugoslavia from the 1960s onwards. Recentralisation meant stripping the republics of
control over companies, banks and finance and eventually overturning the 1974
Constitution which had transformed Yugoslavia into a confederation of semi-
independent states. Two opposed programmes emerged, both of which linked
nationalist ambitions with neoliberal reform and greater European integration. For
Serbia’s politicians, federal recentralisation meant revoking the autonomy of Serbia’s
provinces so as to provide weaker Serbian industry with a domestic market. For the
politicians of the rich northern republics (Slovenia and Croatia), less, not more, of the
state was the answer. They wanted less spending on the poorer republics and possibly
less of the Federation, since they thought these to be a barrier to their competitiveness
on the European market. By demanding the republics be stripped of their powers, by
imposing destructive but ineffective shock therapy and by ending the redistribution of
wealth from richer to poorer republics, the IMF and European Community at that time
fuelled the nationalist collapse of Yugoslavia. In this way, the EEC was not only the
agent of the economic disintegration of Yugoslavia, but through promises of future
political integration accelerated its political disintegration.
From the Yugoslav Debt Economy … to the European Debt Economy:
Serbia and Croatia
After the Yugoslav wars, the second phase of the debt economy in Croatia and Serbia
was unveiled under the new transition ideology which proclaimed that only the opening
of markets to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the removal of ‘supply-side rigidities’,
through privatisation of state assets and the deregulation of labour markets, could
deliver investment, technological innovation, productivity and thereby growth and
prosperity. In fact what was at stake was a new round of forced opening to foreign
capital and finance in order to repay the outstanding ex-Yugoslav debt. Far from
improving the competitiveness of the export sector or creating real demand as expressed
in investment in fixed capital, financialisation institutionalised the credit and import-led
model of economic growth of the past. Foreign flows of investment and credit, as in
Hungary, the rest of the Balkans, and the Baltic states, spawned a speculative consumer
bubble, based on ballooning private debt and trade deficits, which powered high rates of
growth in the 2000s, collapsing when the tap ran dry with the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008.
Total Croatian external debt quintupled, from 20.3 per cent to 101.6 per cent of GDP
in the period 1995–2012. In Serbia, where significant post-Milošević debt write-offs
sweetened the bitter pill of yet another IMF structural adjustment (shock therapy)
programme, total external debt fell dramatically from 140 per cent of GDP in 2000 to
54.1 per cent in 2004, before embarking on an unstoppable ascent, reaching 85.6 per
cent of GDP in 2012, and still rising. The states of the former Yugoslavia now have a
combined debt five times greater than Yugoslavia in 1990. The debt crises of the 1970s
and 1980s have returned with a vengeance, accompanied by the same unsustainable
trade deficits (in Croatia -22.6 per cent and in Serbia -22.3 per cent of GDP in 2008). At
the end of 2012 the Croatian foreign debt amounted to $64.25 billion, while its total
stock of FDI came to an estimated $31.6 billion. The respective totals for Serbia for the
end of 2012 were $33.7 billion and an estimated $23.2 billion. Thus the opening to
foreign capital (FDI and financial flows) in reality represented a transfer of value to EU
capitals, the very sign of dependent development, taking the concrete form of the
combination of a debt trap and external recession (i.e. the collapse of external financial
flows).
The present regional economic crisis is bound up with the long-term decline in profit
rates in the advanced capitalist countries. Neoliberalism represented a series of
measures geared to the intensification of the rate of exploitation. But this only partially
restored profitability and left the problem of unsold goods as wage earners faced falling
living standards. According to David Harvey, the origins of neoliberalism lie in the
attempt to resolve this contradiction by inducing households and consumers to increase
levels of borrowing and spending.5 This was made possible by the greater autonomy of
the financial system: the proliferation of new financial institutions (fusion of
commercial and investment banking, rise of mutual funds and the shadow banking
sector of hedge funds, private equity firms and structured investment vehicles) and
instruments (e.g. credit derivatives), and the integration of these and other economic
actors, including households and non-financial companies, into the financial markets.
Surplus capital that could not find outlets for productive investment was captured by the
financial markets, resulting in international speculative and asset booms in mergers and
acquisitions, real estate, consumer lending, currency markets and credit derivatives,
which in turn provided markets for export economies like Germany, Japan and China.
Financialisation orchestrated a global system of imbalances between creditor economies
with large trade surpluses and high rates of saving (China, Japan and Germany) and
economies with large trade deficits and high rates of borrowing (principally the US, but
also the backward economies of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and the
Balkans).
Notwithstanding the transition mantra of export-led growth, Croatia and Serbia were
assigned the part of peripheral debtor economies in the global system of
financialisation, obliged to open up to the rapine of excess financial liquidity generated
by the cheap money policies of the Eurozone centre, thereby becoming completely
dependent on external sources of growth. Let us now examine the key dimensions of
regional financialisation and the resulting patterns of capitalist development.
Firstly, and most importantly, there is the financialisation of the exchange rate
regime. In line with the ‘Washington Consensus’ propounded by the international
financial institutions, and institutionalised in Yugoslavia since the 1980s,
macroeconomic policy has sought to control the money supply and target inflation with
the aim of ‘price stability’. The mechanism to achieve this is the ‘monetary anchor’, a
type of fixed exchange rate; in the case of the Croatian kuna, indexed to the euro. The
anchor can only work if a tight monetary policy based on high interest rates is pursued.
The real function of monetary policy is not price stability but to ‘anchor’ the debt
economy; that is, to prevent the depreciation of national currencies and so maintain the
flow of debt repayment and keep down the cost of imports. High interest rates and
‘strong’ currencies were designed to attract foreign credits, enabling the borrowing
needed to pay for imports. In this way foreign credits subsidized the import and credit
boom of the 2000s. The same monetary regime that attracted foreign credits and
privatisation receipts was also responsible for destroying industry. Expensive money
acted as a disincentive to investment in the real economy, while overvalued currencies
made exports uncompetitive.
In the 1990s, industrial output declined dramatically, initially due to IMF-imposed
liberalisation and shock therapy in 1989–90, which was anchored by a fixed exchange
rate regime, followed by the disintegration of the all-Yugoslav market, and then
international sanctions and wars. The main driver thereafter of deindustrialisation and
loss of export competitiveness was expensive money and overvalued currencies. In
Serbia industrial production in 2010 was barely 50 per cent of 1990 levels, while in
Croatia it was still only slightly above 90 per cent. Croatian exports shrivelled from 40
per cent of GDP in 1987 to 19.5 per cent in 2010, and from 39.2 per cent to 24.7 per
cent of GDP in Serbia over the same period. The lack of competitiveness of exports
intensified two related Yugoslav era trends: technological dependency as expressed in
low-wage, labour-intensive economies; and structural unemployment reflected in the
export of migrant labour to the EU.6 Deindustrialisation went hand in hand with
structural budget and trade deficits, which could only be covered by increased
borrowing, foreign worker remittances, and privatisation receipts, resulting in the debt
crisis we see today.
A system of fixed exchange rates presupposes the (at least partial) coverage and the
convertibility of domestic money into foreign currency reserves. Hence in such a regime
the state no longer controls the money supply (as in the Eurozone). Any deficit in the
current account (balance of trade and capital flows) directly uses up currency reserves
and thus contracts the quantity of money in the national economy, which has a negative
knock-on effect on economic activity. Hence the goal of monetary policy is to build up
fiscal surpluses, which must be invested in the purchase of foreign currencies in order to
cover the issue of domestic money. As the primary goal is price stability, appreciative
pressures on national currencies accompanying capital account liberalisation are
countered by the purchase of foreign currencies on exchange markets. But this merely
increases the money supply, necessitating further such purchases to rein in inflation. In
Croatia and Serbia foreign currencies are purchased from foreign banks by the issuing of
government bonds denominated in both national currencies and euros at lucrative rates
of interest. The outcome is an outflow of capital to the foreign banks as expressed in a
permanent current account deficit. Fiscal policy is geared to improving state finances
through privatisation and FDI receipts, thereby integrating government spending with
the financial flows that underpin the debt economy. The financing of state budgets is
itself financialised.
The exchange rate regime found its inseparable twin in the liberalisation of the
banking system, the second major dimension of regional financialisation. FDI receipts
from the sale of the regional banking sector to foreign banks provided much needed
foreign currency reserves to preserve fixed exchange rates, repay public debt and cover
current account deficits.7 To encourage market entry, minimum equity investment
requirements were set at ludicrously low levels (e.g. €5 million in Serbia), thereby
institutionalising ‘fractional banking’, where currency reserves placed in central banks
only partially cover deposits, and the growth of bank assets is highly leveraged. Under
the system of partial reserves central banks offered surplus liquidity on the money
market to highly leveraged banks, so providing institutional support for the debt
pyramid.
The introduction of the euro and the downward convergence of interest rates across
the Eurozone signalled a more aggressive entry by the European banks into the region.
More generally, the extra profits accruing from the difference between Eurozone and
domestic market interest rates stimulated the rapacious growth of private sector credit,
especially in mortgage lending, inflating real estate prices and a construction bubble.
Consumer borrowing exacerbated current account problems as it typically financed the
purchase of imported goods. The Euroisation of private credit, whereby the majority of
loans are denominated in or indexed to European currencies, was both an outcome of
the fixed exchange rate regime and a further sign of the loss of independence of
monetary policy. Euroisation allowed the banks to transfer exchange rate risks to
domestic borrowers. For the latter, the attractiveness of foreign currency credit rested on
lower interest rates (than domestic currency loans) and expectations that exchange rates
would continue to appreciate, or remain fixed to the euro. In the context of the financial
crisis, the appreciation of the Swiss franc, and in Serbia the depreciation of the Serbian
dinar, have transferred a share of foreign bank losses and risk to, respectively, Croatian
and Serbian households and businesses. Here we see another dimension of
financialisation – the future wealth of households is made dependent on financial
market fluctuations over which they have no control.
Privatisation represented a third major dimension of financialisation. FDI was
concentrated in the wholesale and retail trade, transport and communications, financial
services and banking. However, these ‘non-tradable’ sectors do not contribute to
exports. In fact they sucked in imports, widening trade deficits. FDI rarely took the form
of ‘greenfield’ or industrial investment. Capital flows were dominated by bank loans to
the private sector and households. State monopolies became private monopolies and
profits were repatriated. Contrary to neoliberal dogma, FDI has not served to open
regional economies to competition or investment. Its real function was quite different;
namely, as a component of financial flows. In general privatisation was simply a link in
the chain of the debt economy, allowing the insider class of state and firm managers to
secure property rights, or criminals to launder illegal earnings, at the expense of the
destruction of industry. Property titles allowed owners to strip assets, resell company
plant, equipment and land, or take out loans against these, using the money to
speculate in real estate transactions, the import trade and government securities, which
in turn provided surety against new borrowing.8 Interest rate differentials both set
privatisation capital flows in motion and completed the debt circle as superprofits were
repatriated by the foreign banks. The economics of fictitious growth (in financial claims
on future values) by means of the plunder and destruction of the real economy was
conditioned by the contradictions of the fixed exchange rate regime, which both drew in
a plentiful supply of money capital and acted as a disincentive to investment in the real
economy.
The debt economy was in fact an engine of wealth transfer from the poor to the rich.
Rising inequality found its concentrated expression in the rise of a class of monopoly
capitalists, known locally as ‘tycoons’.9 The reverse side of this concentration of wealth
was mass unemployment, falling living standards due to permanent inflationary
pressures, and hence forced borrowing from the banks to supplement inadequate wages.
This was the class significance of financialisation.
The inescapable conclusion is that the three major regional processes of
financialisation – the fixed exchange rate regime, financial liberalisation, and
privatisation – have been responsible for a catastrophic integration into the Eurozone
debt economy, amounting to European integration before the actual European
integration of these countries. Monetary convergence and Euroisation destroyed
industry and flung the region into debt slavery at the hands of the European banks. In
Croatia today, the defence of kuna parity against the euro in order to prevent an
uncontrolled default only deepens the crisis. The situation is identical to that of
peripheral countries like Greece in the fixed exchange rate system of the Eurozone.
Indexing prevents external adjustment through devaluation and imposes what is called
an ‘internal devaluation’, that is, debt repayment by means of prolonged austerity and
wage compression, which depress demand and thus the means to repay debt.10 Further
integration will merely intensify these trends, as can be seen from the Slovenian
experience.
The Slovene Exception?
Slovenia is not normally thought of as a ‘transition economy’. Indeed it is often held up
by Keynesians and Marxists11 as a model of an export economy that has achieved high
living standards and levels of investment in the real economy by avoiding the horrors of
liberalisation. Appearances are, as they say, deceptive, and I will argue that its present
banking and debt crisis reflects a crisis of integration in the EU, which also led Slovenia
to become dependent on cheap foreign credits for growth. This crisis calls into question
the long-term viability of the Slovene model and offers a negative lesson in the likely
impact of EU integration for Serbia and Croatia.
The European single currency spelt the end of national macroeconomic policy as
national governments lost the right either to issue money or to alter exchange rates, and
could only vary interest rates and public borrowing within very narrow limits.
Monetary union reflected the interests of the most technologically advanced capitals, led
by Germany, whose exchange rate policy was determined by the need to prevent
inflation from increasing the international prices of their exports. Weaker capitals,
which had often employed devaluation to make their exports more competitive, and the
resulting inflation to redistribute value away from the working class, could no longer
employ these tools.
In exchange, they obtained two apparent advantages.12 Firstly, the loss of the power
to issue money or vary interest rates, combined with the tight monetary regime of the
ECB, forced all capitals to increase labour productivity. Secondly, for the more
peripheral members of the EU like Greece, the adoption of the euro narrowed the spread
between the interest rates on their bonds and on those of the strongest European
economy, Germany, enabling them to borrow more cheaply.
However, while all capitals were able to force down labour unit costs, Germany
achieved the greatest savings, resulting in increasing imbalances across the Eurozone as
German exports opened up big trade deficits with the more backward countries of the
Eurozone periphery.13 The latter took advantage of cheaper interest rates to borrow
money from the banks of the core in order to cover these deficits, laying the basis for
unsustainable debt-financed growth and thus the financial crisis of the Eurozone.
The Slovenian export model – supplying the manufacturing industry of Germany,
Italy and Austria – was predicated on the rejection of the neoliberal regime of shock
therapy, fixed exchange rates and opening to foreign capital. A floating exchange rate
was managed so as to prevent currency appreciation from cutting into export
competitiveness. Monetary convergence with the euro from 2004 marked the end of an
independent exchange rate policy. At the same time Slovenia was unable to hold down
unit labour costs as much as its German, Austrian and French competitors, resulting in a
growing trade deficit.14 Monetary convergence cut into the competitiveness of its
exports, revealing a relative decline in labour productivity.15 As a labour-intensive
producer, Slovenia increasingly lost out to more technologically advanced producers like
Germany.16 Hence it began to fall into the same pattern of financing its trade deficit
with consumer borrowing as the peripheral economies of the Eurozone.
From 2004, an orgy of borrowing was unleashed, centred on the construction,
mortgage and retail industries, and on financial services. Enticed by lower interest rates
in the Eurozone, Slovene banks borrowed heavily abroad and became dependent on
short-term Eurozone finance. Private sector debt shot up from 50.8 per cent of GDP in
2006 to 82.7 per cent in 2008. Record borrowing financed a wave of highly leveraged
management buyouts – i.e. the debt contracted to pay for privatisation was loaded onto
companies – which turned sour when stock markets tumbled during the crisis, the real
estate bubble burst and construction companies went bust. Problems were exacerbated
by a system of cross-shareholdings that had a knock-on effect on other companies which
banks were forced to seize as collateral, increasing the weight of bad debt on their books
and provoking a banking crisis, and, with the bailout of the banks, a full-blown public
debt crisis (public debt tripled from 23 per cent of GDP in 2008 to just under 70 per cent
in 2013).
Thus the Slovenian financial crisis is a crisis of European integration. It reveals that
Slovenia has not escaped the regional crisis of dependency on external markets and
finance. It is European capital that determines what, how and for which markets it will
produce. From this perspective rising living standards are a barrier to further
accumulation. FDI outflows in the 2000s are a sign that Slovenian capital is increasingly
compelled to outsource production to the low-wage ex-Yugoslav region. The ambition to
use outward investment to undermine domestic wages and welfare spending reveals
that a Slovene exception to regional neoliberalism is an illusion.
Regional Alternatives to EU Regionalism
The lessons of the Slovenian experience are clear. EU integration will further undermine
the competitiveness of the Croatian and Serbian export sectors, resulting in a continuing
transfer of value to the European banks, via the structural trade deficit and external
debt. Once again debt will serve as the lever for another round of opening to foreign
capital. So far foreign capital has been reluctant to invest in the real economy, outside
limited branches, since it faces a series of small consumer markets that are weakly
integrated and do not promise expanding sales. To create the kind of internal market
that would be attractive to foreign investors, the EU imposed the Central European Free
Trade Agreement (est. 2006) on the Western Balkans (including Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and Moldova).17
CEFTA aims to create a free market (limited to tariff and quota reductions), not a
customs or currency union: in other words, the aim is to prepare the region for
integration with the EU, not to promote a regional integration that would conflict with
EU integration. Integration takes the form of a ‘hub and spokes’ model in which trade
and investment in each of these countries is diverted towards the EU. The EU has
become the main trading partner of all countries, accounting in 2008 for 55 to 80 per
cent of the imports and exports of the Western Balkans. Therefore, given the structural
weakness of regional exports under the system of fixed exchange rates, CEFTA in fact
represents a free trade zone for EU exports. Furthermore, as in the case of the trade
agreements between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the EEC, and of
the first CEFTA (established in 1991 between Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic),
access to the EU market is restricted precisely in areas of regional comparative
advantage. Therefore the second CEFTA, just like the first, will mean the restructuring of
the regional economy to serve the needs of the European multinationals and yet more
deindustrialisation.18 The present structural adjustment programmes in Slovenia and
Croatia, under which the public sector, health provision and pensions are being opened
to foreign capital in order to repay external debt, are the sign of things to come.
Due to the need to balance external deficits with the EU there has been a limited trend
towards the revival of intra-regional trade, facilitated but not caused by the
liberalisation of tariff barriers under CEFTA. In many ways this is a return to the 1970s
when difficulties in EEC markets forced Yugoslavia to reorient exports to Comecon
markets. The problem here is that each ex-Yugoslav state tries to run a trade surplus
with the others to compensate for deficits with the EU, thereby blocking the further
development of intra-regional trade.19 It is partly to address this difficulty that Slovenia
has begun to extend import credits and outsource production to the region.20
The case of Slovenia, as the most advanced regional economy, shows the limits of
intra-regional integration. It is both impelled by external dependency on EU finance
and structurally limited by it. The EU model of Balkan integration spurs
deindustrialisation and erects a fragile consumer economy built on a pyramid of debt.
As we see in the current regional double-dip recession, without external finance there is
no economic growth. Regional integration is caught between the Scylla of EU
dependency and the Charybdis of the narrowness of the national market. The whole of
the former Yugoslavia is locked into a process of peripheralisation.
EU regional policy for the Balkans is also part and parcel of the imperialist
fragmentation of the region into a set of competing statelets and neo-colonial
protectorates (Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo). Under the doctrine of ‘regional
cooperation’ the EU has sought to police the new geopolitical order and prepare the
region for EU integration, following on the heels of NATO expansion. A moveable set of
iron curtains has been erected, dividing regional ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the race to
European integration. In the 1990s the EU raised undeclared sanctions against Croatia
when President Tudjman rejected regional cooperation outright, while Milošević was
rewarded for guaranteeing the Dayton Agreement of 1995 with an EU trade agreement.
Today, one of the main reasons for the advancement of Croatian EU accession is that
the Serbian– Albanian struggle over Kosovo has become a proxy for struggles between
the EU-US and Russia for hegemony in the post-Soviet East. EU regionalism thus creates
a new arena for the nationalist struggles in the post-Yugoslav states.21
The EU model of regional financial integration is both iniquitous and unviable.
Regional nation-states have not been able to withstand external economic and military
pressures, and have tended to respond by competing with each other for external
sponsorship in the vain and disastrous pursuit of regional hegemony. The alternative, I
believe, lies in a Balkan federation,22 that is, a form of cooperation uniting the peoples
of the region in a common purpose: to liberate the region from external dependency
and internal strife, maximise the welfare of its peoples and make them the subjects of
their own destiny. The experience of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
proof that the logic of market competition itself produces uneven development, and can
only exacerbate existing inequalities between regions, fanning nationalist resentments.
Hence the first step towards a new regional order is a break with the political economy
of financialisation, and its defence of the value of money (debt) at the expense of the
destruction of commodities, in favour of a political economy that promotes the welfare
of labour by redistributing resources towards employment, welfare provision and living
standards. The nationalisation of the banks and industry would provide the instruments
for regional coordination of investment to tackle inequalities in development; for the
establishment of mechanisms of regional solidarity and cooperation; and for a
participatory economics in which sovereignty resides in the direct producers and local
communities. It is time to make a transition from the transition.
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